DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 228 668 CS 504 161

AUTHOR Brownlee, Don, Ed.
TITLE CEDA Yearbook.
INSTITUTION Cross-Examination Debate Association.
PUB DATE 83
NOTE 43p.; Original document marginally legible.
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Communication (Thought Transfer); *Communication Skills; *Debate; Intercultural Communication; *Persuasive Discourse; *Professional Associations; *Speech Communication
IDENTIFIERS *Cross Examination Debate Association

ABSTRACT

The eight articles in this collection deal with various aspects of cross examination debate and with the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA). Topics discussed in the articles include: (1) the philosophy and development of the CEDA, (2) the relationship of the CEDA with the National Debate Topic (NDT), (3) an intercultural approach to value proposition debate, (4) the process of valuing as a test of the existence of a value claim, (5) philosophical systems as paradigms for value debate, (6) the expanded role for cross examination in CEDA debate, (7) the replacement of the word "should" with the word "ought" in debate resolutions, and (8) presumption in the value proposition realm. (FL)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ED228668

CEDA
CEDA
CEDA
CEDA

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Don Brownlee

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CS504161

YEARBOOK 1983

CEDA YEARBOOK

EDITOR

Don Brownlee

CONTRIBUTORS

Allan D. Louden and
Curtis C. Austin

Rob Norton

Dwight T. Podgurski

Don R. Swanson

James E. Tomlinson

Walter Ulrich

Janet E. Vasilius

Raymond Bud Zeuschner

Cross-Examination Debate Association **1983**

CONTENTS

"The Philosophy and Development of CEDA" 1

James E. Tomlinson
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

"CEDA vs. NDT: A Dysfunctional Myth" 6

Allan D. Louden
University of Southern California

Curtis C. Austin
University of Southern California

"Back to Basics: An Intercultural Approach to Value Proposition Debate" 13

Janet E. Vasilius
University of Arizona

"The Process of Valuing as a Test of the Existence of a Value Claim" 18

Don R. Swanson
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

"Philosophical Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate" 22

Walter Ulrich
University of Alabama

"Remembering What the C.E. Stands For: Toward a Greater Role for Cross-Examination in CEDA Debate" 29

Rob Norton
University of California, Riverside

"We Ought to be Afraid of 'Should' But Should We Be Afraid of 'Ought'?" 32

Raymond Bud Zeuschner
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

"Presumption in the Value Proposition Realm" 34

Dwight T. Podgurski
California State University, Northridge

THE PHILOSOPHY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CEDA

Presented at

The Eastern Value Debate Conference

October 9-10, 1982

James E. Tomlinson

Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

For the past nine years I have been proud to be associated with the Cross-Examination Debate Association, both as a debater and as a director of debate. In those years I have felt privileged to have participated in the development of value-oriented debate, which has become a viable option for college debaters. I have been fortunate also in having been on the west coast as CEDA first started, and now to be in the east as it rapidly takes root here as well. CEDA is today a large and important collegiate organization. It is one that has fundamental concepts at its base, and it is my purpose to review those concepts with you and address some of our problems as well. I appreciate the invitation to share with you my observations and experiences. I hope they will help you in your explorations of CEDA.

To explain why so many people perceive a need for CEDA, it is vital to understand what collegiate debate was like before CEDA. Let us begin our discussion by examining the characteristics of American collegiate debate in the late 1960's. First of all, debate tournaments used the Oxford style of debate. That is a format without cross-examination. What cross-examination did exist was rare and scattered. Usually cross-examination was used in regional association tournaments, in Lincoln/Douglas and in "off-topic" debate. My own experience in "traditional" or NDT debate (1968-70), was that we had perhaps one or two cross-exam opportunities per year in southern California. A second characteristic of 1960's debate was that propositions of policy were used. A national debate topic has been chosen in the U.S. since 1920. Only in the 1921-22 academic year was a non-policy topic chosen. Thus, policy debate was the predominant type of resolution. Again, as with cross-exam, some regional tournaments might offer off-topic non-policy questions, but this too was relatively rare. Thirdly, the national topic was to be debated for the entire year. Finally, a national championship was available. This championship, in existence since 1946, was achieved by a single debate team at the National Debate Tournament.

These basic characteristics are not objectionable, are they? Of course not. But, during the late 1960's there were some developments related to those basic characteristics which did become objectionable to many in the debate community. Affirmative teams began to more narrowly interpret the resolution. These attempts were made to catch the negative unprepared for the particular affirmative interpretation. Today we recognize these creative innovations as "squirrel" cases. We might define a "squirrel" case as one which is so narrow that it ignores most of the resolution, or is actually off the topic and yet the affirmative tries to make it appear that the case is topical.

Unfortunately, such affirmative cases began winning debates. Then when such cases succeeded at the National Debate Tournament, other schools naturally copied the tactic. Thus, since the late 1960's the narrow interpretation of the resolution has been increasingly accepted.

I can recall the incredible controversy over the 1975-76 NDT resolution, "Resolved: That the Federal Government Should Adopt a Comprehensive Program to Control Land Use in the U.S." Now, most of us have some idea of what was intended by this topic. I was flabbergasted to hear, in the first tournament of that year, a marijuana case. Yes, you heard right, a marijuana case. You see, the affirmative claimed that; (1) marijuana was a significant problem, (2) that marijuana grows in the land, and (3) therefore the growing of marijuana is land use and thus topical. In the very next tournament another affirmative case was even more creative. The affirmative claimed; (1) methods for institutionalizing people in mental hospitals must be revised, (2) mental hospitals are constructed on land, and (3) this was obviously land use, therefore it was topical. Both of these cases actually won debates, though not on the ballots I filled out. I recognize that these two examples are a bit extreme, but the fact remains that certain aspects of what we now call NDT debate, actually encouraged such activity.

These developments produced a strongly negative reaction for many in the debate community and stimulated the birth of CEDA. I will not detail that beginning here, you may look at Dr. Don Brownlee's CEDA YEARBOOKS, or the Fall 1981 issue of The Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta to catch up on the history of the organization. The point is that CEDA provided an attractive alternative, as you can see from the rate of growth that I have summarized in Table I. I have also included (at the end of this article) the first listing of all the topics chosen for debate in CEDA.

Let's turn our attention to some of the current controversy in CEDA. Many of you have chosen to attend this conference because you are not sure what to do with a value-oriented topic. When a value topic was first chosen for use in CEDA (the 1974-75 debate year), no one knew what to do! Those of use who were debating then were forced to be creative, to experiment. It was a very exciting year, a year of innovation which witnessed unique affirmative approaches and negative responses. We did not, and you should not, rely on traditional policy strategies. I am convinced that it is that sense of challenge and excitement that has attracted many of you to CEDA. Now, I don't want you to think of CEDA as only being value debate. CEDA has a basic philosophy that is applicable to either policy or value debate. It just so happens that for the past eight years we have chosen resolutions that have been clearly value in orientation.

CEDA was formed to stress some balance among evidence, appropriate delivery, and analysis. Another hallmark of CEDA has been to ask debaters to remember the intent of the resolution. These are qualities to be retained in any CEDA round. To ignore them is to reject the basic philosophy of the organization. The problem we face today, I believe, is that some people have "joined the CEDA bandwagon" without understanding that basic philosophy and the

reasons many of us felt compelled to form and support an organization separate from NDT debate. Thus, we have some people looking at CEDA debate topics as if they were NDT topics! Over the past three to four years, we find there has been an increasingly narrow focus by the affirmative, and ever widening negative arguments. Sounds familiar, doesn't it? I'm afraid that unless we somehow recall why CEDA was formed, we may lose the attractiveness and vitality that has made the organization as popular as it has become.

I admit that value debate is a challenge intellectually. You will not find textbooks filled with strategies for you to use, as you can for policy debate. The problem is that too many debaters have been taking the easy way out. They drag policy considerations into the value arena. For example, why in a value-oriented topic does the affirmative have to deal with inherency? In the past three years I've witnessed an increasing number of debates where negative teams demand, and judges give wins, based on inherency. I've asked why this is happening, and get a response such as "well, inherency is always part of a debate." Sure it is, in policy! Inherency makes a great deal of sense in policy, it does not have much justification in value debate. A few years ago, when several new schools began debating in CEDA this same problem arose, but it was widely considered to be an irrelevant issue. In fact, CEDA has adopted some resolutions where the traditional inherency arguments would have to be reversed!

And what about the use of plans? Again, there has been a startling increase in the number of affirmatives who offer and the number of negatives who demand a plan. Some of my colleagues claim that their debaters have a right to produce plans, even interpret the resolution as policy, if they wish to. That sounds remarkably familiar, at least to me. It is the same justification for what happened in NDT debate some 15 years ago. I would remind those who take this position, that in CEDA we have deliberately worded topics so that they would not be interpreted as policy, so that debaters may explore non-policy considerations. If a plan is introduced, the debate shifts from values back into policy bringing with it PMN's and PMA's and CA's. We also know what it forces most negative teams to do, they begin to rely on policy responses. I have not yet seen a debate on a value oriented topic where a team can handle both true value considerations and also a plan. Unfortunately, most negative teams will not argue that the plan is inappropriate. They might try doing just that. For eight years CEDA has deliberately worded topics to avoid policy, a team that ignores that intentionality of the resolution has ignored one of the basic tenets of the organization that sponsors the topic they are debating. I would remind you that initially in CEDA's use of value debate, plans and arguments related to them were deemed inappropriate. I have not been persuaded that this position should be rejected.

The point I'm trying to make is that out of eight years of experience with value oriented topics, it is only in the past three to four years that these problems have arisen. They have not arisen because of innovations in value argumentation, but because of increased reliance on policy debate strategies being forced into value debate. If we continue to allow this to happen, I

believe that CEDA will lose one of its most important philosophical roots. Those of you debating in CEDA and those of us judging must insist on some understanding and commitment to CEDA's basic ideals.

These are some of the issues that I believe we must face up to in the next couple of years. We must make some decisions about what this organization is supposed to be and how we can best serve the people who are part of it. I would be very disappointed if we did not face up to the challenge. If we don't CEDA may well become nothing but a shadow of its original idea, and a poor imitation of NDT debate.

TABLE I

SUMMARY TABLE OF GROWTH IN THE
CROSS-EXAMINATION DEBATE ASSOCIATION

	YEAR				
	1971-72	1974-75	1978-79	1981-82	1982-83
Colleges and Universities Participating	18	47	102	239	(anticipated 30% increase over 81-82)
Number of Tournaments	7	15	67	102	161*

*Number of tournaments scheduled for 1982-83

TOPICS SELECTED FOR DEBATE BY CEDA 1971-82

1971-72		Resolved: That the United States should withdraw all its ground combat forces from bases located outside the western hemisphere.
1972-73	(fall)	Resolved: That the penal system in the United States should be significantly improved.
	(spring)	Resolved: That the United States should seek to restore normal diplomatic and economic relations with the present government of Cuba.
1973-74	(fall)	Resolved: That victimless crimes should be legalized.
	(spring)	Resolved: That the United States should reduce its commitment to Israel.
1974-75	(fall)	Resolved: That the federal government should grant amnesty to all those who evaded the draft during the Vietnam war.
	(spring)	Resolved: That American television has sacrificed quality for entertainment.
1975-76		Resolved: That education has failed its mission in the United States.
1976-77		Resolved: That legal protection of accused persons in the United States unnecessarily hinders law enforcement agencies.
1977-78		Resolved: That affirmative action programs have been deleterious in their effects.
1978-79		Resolved: That a United States foreign policy significantly directed toward the furtherance of human rights is desirable.
1979-80		Resolved: That compulsory national service for all qualified U.S. citizens is desirable.
1980-81	(fall)	Resolved: That protection of the national environment is a more important goal than the satisfaction of American energy demands.
	(spring)	Resolved: That activism in politics by religious groups harms the American political process.
1981-82	(fall)	Resolved: That unauthorized immigration into the United States is seriously detrimental to the United States.
	(spring)	Resolved: That the American judicial system has overemphasized the rights of the accused.

CEDA VS. NDT: A DYSFUNCTIONAL MYTH

Allan D. Louden and Curtis C. Austin
University of Southern California

> Forensics is an educational activity primarily concerned with using an argumentative perspective in examining problems and communicating with people. An argumentative perspective on communication involves the study of reason giving by people as justification for acts, beliefs, attitudes and values. From this perspective, forensics activities, including debate and individual events, are laboratories for helping students to understand and communicate various forms of argument more effectively in a variety of contexts with a variety of audiences.[1]

If forensics is indeed an educational activity, then the "coach" should be guided by the desire to provide the best education possible to forensic competitors. The experimentation and innovation, which have characterized competitive debate since its inception in this country serve as testimony that most coaches have taken seriously their educational responsibilities.[2] Forensic educators have primarily pursued two complementary concerns: The study of argument and the development of delivery skills. There has always been disagreement on the relative importance of these two goals. Even in the early 1900's criteria for judgment in academic debate reflected this tension. "/S/ometime a basis of fifty percent was suggested for argument and the same for delivery, sometimes it was sixty for argument and forty for delivery, or even seventy-five and twenty-five."[3]

Even today, the question of emphasis is still with us, as indicated by the way educators view their roles. Although the categories are overly simplified, coaches have divided themselves into two broad camps. These categories reflect different pedagogical assumptions of what the purpose of a forensic education should be, and imply the standards a critic should use in evaluating a debate. First, many educators view themselves primarily as "teachers of argumentation." These educators follow a tradition, exemplified by Whately and Perelman, which focuses on logos or reason giving. Consequently the debate round is interpreted as a contest of arguments and the judge serves as a critic of argumentation.

The second category eminates from a tradition more closely aligned with concerns of Blair and Winans. This tradition views the goal of forensic education within a public speaking model. These "teachers of public address," emphasize the ethical and pathetic forms of proof which induce audience adherence. Consequently, the debate judge evaluates the style and delivery skills as an integral part of any decision.

Of course, all debate coaches recognize the importance of both the argument and performance factors, but the underlying assumptions of each tradition suggest the prominence each factor plays in pedagogical application. Consider the practices which each model emphasizes. The first class of scholars requires a primary role for research in their educational systems. This emphasis stems from the understanding that the research abilities required of highly competitive intercollegiate forensics provide the student with skills critical to the creation, discovery and understanding of arguments. Likewise,

the second class of scholars emphasizes the search for "all the available means of persuasion" in reference to a particular audience. Thus, analysis, humor, style, etc., are of primary concern to such educators.

Nevertheless, we see today an increasingly polarized world in the forensic community. "Teachers of argument" too often are known only as NDT coaches. Those educators who emphasize delivery and style are increasingly lumped in the category of "CEDA only." The feud which separates "CEDA people" from "NDT people" is as useless and artificial as the separation of argument and delivery. An advocate should be trained in both the study of argument and the skills necessary for persuasive delivery. It is not the purpose of the authors to deny the differences in focus of CEDA and NDT debate, it is rather to celebrate it. We are concerned that forensic coaches often fail to appreciate the role performed by each of the debate formats and the value of each. This lack of understanding is harmful for the activity in general and for the student in particular.

This past spring, Jack Howe issued the "Report of the Executive Secretary of CEDA - 1982."[4] In his report, a genuine concern is expressed as to the future direction of CEDA debate. He reminded CEDA coaches of the roots of the activity, stressing the goals of "communicative delivery, a balance among evidence, argument, and analysis, audience appeals and appropriate demands on students' time and energy." Because we agree that CEDA focuses on unique educational goals, we find the concern expressed in the report encouraging. However, Howe's report is also somewhat disconcerting. The point of view of the report can be interpreted in no other way than displaying an extreme "ethnocentrism." One symptom of this ethnocentric attitude is the espousal of the position that CEDA, by maintaining the "true" values of debate, will save the activity from itself. In other words, CEDA represents what is good in debate and NDT represents what is leading to debate's demise. Howe states:

> To those students who now debate CEDA with no regard for a communicative delivery and who believe that the key to success in CEDA is the amassing of hoards of evidence to the disparagement of argumentation and analysis and who persist in distorting our debate topics so as to make a mockery of them, I suggest that there is an alternative form of debate available: it is called NDT. Since you have not left it in spirit, then why don't you rejoin it in actuality?[5]

By implication, then, if you want to speak poorly, engage in bad argument and analysis and distort the activity, you are an NDT debater. If you insist on bad practices, join the misdirected. Needless to say, we take offense at this comment and believe that such causes serious injury to the activity.

Unfortunately, we believe that dichotomous thinking is increasingly characteristic of debaters and coaches alike. Comments often heard at tournaments are typified by the following:

> "CEDA is saving debate from the excesses of the narrow and self-serving NDT types," or
>
> "CEDA is for those who cannot make it in 'real' debate."

This categorical thinking is also reflected in Howe's affectionate references in the report to the "CEDA clan's" commitment to solidarity and

openness. By implication then, there must be a closed exclusive "NDT clan" existant in the forensics community. The reference to clans are by their very nature perjorative. Classification of CEDA and NDT into clans makes it more difficult to think holistically in terms of a "debate community." It is such attitudes which are key to understanding the trends which so disturb Professor Howe.

There is a growing consensus that forensics has changed in the last decade. Traditional debate has suffered in terms of participation vis-a-vis other forms of forensics competition.[6] This decline has been explained by many in the "CEDA clan" as a failure of NDT to reflect the "important" factors of a forensics education, namely delivery and audience appeal.[7] Given the perspective of the historical debate between advocates of each pedagogical position, we find this excuse less than satisfactory.[8] An alternative hypothesis would suggest that NDT has changed for more fundamental reasons. First, NDT became more and more insular, excluding other styles of debate. Success was defined in terms of national circuit competition and squads became increasingly specialized to meet the challenge. Secondly, the information explosion and the need to find ways of accommodating the data deluge changed the activity.[9] One response to numerous cases and information availability has been shifts in theory and practices to maintain argumentative equilibrium. NDT debate now requires the knowledge of sophisticated gamesmanship in rounds. The use of various theoretical "paradigms" which enable many of the complicated maneuvers in rounds has not been without positive effect. Such developments have, for example, stimulated related work in argumentation theory and lead to careful review of the assumptions underlying the activity.[10] The problem, of course, is that such development often works against other goals, such as providing a forensics education to a broad range of students. Thus debate becomes an activity for the select few. Increased sophistication necessarily means higher "entry barriers." Obtaining a level of proficiency which equates with success requires long internship periods. As a consequence, participation has decline. It is almost as though we have a sign on the door which reads, "Only the very brightest and already trained need apply." In many instances CEDA has provided debate opportunities without excessive "entry barriers." The separatism of CEDA, however, threatens this very strength.

The message here should be very clear for those working to develop CEDA debate. The "practices" of NDT, which are so strongly objected to, are the result of "causes" which increasingly typify CEDA debate.

The adoption of a solitary debate style within programs necessarily raises the caliber of what it takes "to-play-the-game" successfully. As "entry barriers" are raised the successful CEDA debater can be expected to have an extensive high school background. Specialization and increased sophistication is spurred by the "closed system" and the cycle (fed by pursuit of the mythical national title) enters into a spiral not unlike NDT. We are sure many in CEDA would defend trends of increased sophistication and theory development but they should be prepared to be far less critical of NDT's shift in emphasis and recognize the implications for what Howe refers to as the "underlying

strengths" of CEDA. Maintaining realistic "entry barriers", emphasizing a public speaking model and resisting the evidence explosion ask not for a rejection of NDT but rather urge persuasively for programs which do both.

At the risk of being accused of viewing CEDA and NDT hierarchically, we are suggesting that the "underlying strengths" of CEDA can best be maintained when there is strict adherence to those goals while other outlets are made available to the highly experienced and motivated students.

Debate has long been an activity with few "rules" for conduct. Perhaps it is time that CEDA consider restricting, through more formal structures, the practices allowed. This would clarify judging criteria and guarantee CEDA's adherence to certain goals. Concomitant would be a recognition of the different goals of traditional debate and allow it to reflect a more natural evolution. NDT and CEDA would be viewed as supplementary activities within a single program, each contributing different educational goals to the student.

It should be clear by now that both NDT and CEDA debate operate from different pedagogical models, each offering important contributions to a complete forensics education. The schism between debate communities imposes blinders on evaluating the contribution of each debate style for students. In addition, excessive ethnocentrism functions to threaten the very goals that CEDA has traditionally promoted. It is our contention that the best solution is one which offers diversity <u>within</u> programs, not just <u>among</u> programs.

When programs make the choice to offer one or the other of the activities, it is often a carefully considered decision. Circumstances do dictate that some student opportunities cannot be provided within a given program but far too often the choice represents little more than a rationalization. We have heard many <u>excuses</u> and few compelling arguments for the limited program. Consider the following:

1. We only do "X" because the other is morally bankrupt or teaches the wrong skills. Throughout this essay, we have addressed contributions to be made by both forms of debate and can only wonder at the director who has found "truth."
2. Our program only has the resources to do "X". The limited resources each program has to expect is a serious concern of and often dictates hard choices. While resources may limit the number of teams that can effectively be served by a program, this does not seem to be an argument why all teams must be entered CEDA or NDT. Sometimes tournament patterns dictate what is the best use of dollars and time, but if programs were integrated and consequently selected tournaments which rewarded this diversity, this problem would soon disappear. Even now, there is a trend in tournaments, including many which have been exclusively national NDT tournaments, to offer both. Another absurdity could be solved by consolidating national competitions in a way that would not require traveling to different ends of the country in the same year.
3. As directors, we only have the time and expertise to do CEDA <u>or</u> NDT. In some instances this may be the case, <u>but</u> as Director of Forensics

and educators, coaches could and should have expertise in both argumentation and communication theory. Rather than being a reason to limit a program, this seems to argue for better qualified coaches.

Broad based debate programs provide a number of advantages to the activity and to students which an either/or program inhibits.

First, integrated programs would strengthen the idea of a "debate community" as opposed to warring camps. In a time when the activity is threatened economically and academically, working cooperatively can only strengthen the community. The cues are abundant that such a reapproachment is possible and it is time to seize the moment. Arguably the NDT community, through elitist attitudes, has been uninterested in the concerns and values of CEDA debate during the last decade. Such attitudes on the part of NDT schools are changing with the realization that debate must be more broadly based to survive. Many programs which have traditionally offered only NDT are now also participating in CEDA, whereas there are few "CEDA schools" making an effort to offer a meaningful NDT experience. The exclusive attitude among NDT coaches surely was one of the catalysts for CEDA's growth but the response among CEDA people has been no less exclusive or elitist.

It is our position that the ethnocentrism is no more justified when practiced by CEDA programs than it was when practiced by NDT programs. Last February, in an open meeting the National Debate Tournament Committee held at Northwestern University, a frank discussion of primarily "NDT coaches" concluded with the unanimous adoption of the following resolution:

> That it (NDT Committee) ask the AFA to establish a committee to find ways and means of promoting a dialogue among all components of the college forensics community concerning the state and future directions of the activity. This AFA committee should, at a minimum, bring together leaders to the CEDA and NDT debate communities in order to attempt to find common ground for future goals.[11]

We do not know the specific outcome of this particular resolution but offer it as in indication that an atmosphere for reapproachment exists. Failure to recognize the opportunity and retreat into an exclusive "CEDA clan" is to invite the same conditions which reduced NDT's appeal.

Second, integrated programs offer increased opportunities for students. Without a doubt CEDA can provide skills within a communication model emphasizing public disclosure. CEDA also has been a place for students to learn fundamental debate skills without discouraging the novice competitor. These advantages do not demonstrate, however, that NDT should be abandoned. As detailed earlier, NDT provides outlets for many students and uniquely emphasized argumentation theory. Our concern is with those programs which subscribe to the false dichotomy and provide their students only one type of opportunity. It is as equally reprehensible to be unconcerned with communication skills as it is to keep the especially skilled student consistently debating against the less skilled or debating before critics far less sophisticated in argument. It may win the program trophies or sweepstakes points, but the educational rationale is compromised.

Third, integrated programs necessitate an environment where practices in

NDT and CEDA are mutually beneficial. Rather than students learning to distrust each other and finding security in their isolation, an integrated program forces interaction. Whenever people interact, there is a tendency for understanding to increase and for each party to learn from each other.

To the extent CEDA and NDT have merits and limitations, their interaction should serve to moderate and strengthen practices in both. Their symbiotic relationship in an integrated program has healthy implications for theory and practice.

The above arguments should not be interpreted as attacks on CEDA as an integral part of the "debate community." We have both been demonstrably committed to CEDA. What prompted this discussion is a sincere belief that CEDA can provide unique opportunities in debate, as can NDT. We value educationally useful alternatives and hope that CEDA and NDT thrive in a supportive atmosphere. We are convinced that the devisive tone found in the Executive Secretary's Report is harmful to students and CEDA itself. A stronger "debate community" will be formed when programs embrace the benefits of each debate style and celebrate their differences.

NOTES

[1]Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective, ed., James H. McBath (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 11.

[2]A short history of the change and innovation which occurred in the forensics community is found in L. Leroy Cowperthwaite and A. Craig Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating" in A History of Speech Education in America, ed., Karl A. Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), pp. 259-276.

[3]Egbert Ray Nichols, "A Historical Sketch of Intercollegiate Debating: I", Quarterly Journal of Speech 22 (April, 1936), as quoted in Cowperthwaite and Baird, p. 218.

[4]Jack H. Howe, Report of the Executive Secretary of CEDA, May, 1982, p. 1.

[5]Howe, p. 1.

[6]See the Fall 1979 issue of Speaker and Gavel, "Forensics in the Seventies: A Retrospective". The entire issue is a discussion of trends in the last decade.

[7]One concern often expressed by those working primarily with CEDA is that NDT fails to reflect the communication curriculum and ignores important communication skills. It is accurate to observe that delivery skills associated with public speaking have declined but inaccurate to assume that all communication skills are ignored by NDT. Faules, Rieke and Rhodes observe that "Although a great proportion of the speaking that people do is not public, it does not necessarily follow that public speaking is less important than it once was, even though values have changed in terms of oratorical delivery. But there is a need for a re-evaluation of priorities. It can no longer be assumed that public speaking is unequivocally the most important goal of forensics programs. Student behavior which results in increased capacity to communicate, persuade, solve problems and make decisions in the less publicized (but no less important) small conferences, negotiations and interviews are equally important to education." Don Faules, Richard Rieke and Jack Rhodes, Directing Forensics: Contest and Debate Speaking, (Denver, Colo.: Norton Publishing Co., 1976), p. 48.

[8]Many coaches are sincere in their concern with trends in debate and undoubtedly the move to "save debate from itself" is founded on legitimate reservation. It is often helpful, however, to bring some perspective to the

predictions of the eternal pessimists. In the first and second decades of intercollegiate debate in America concerns were raised that sound suspiciously close to present day explanations of "cause-effect" in forensics' demise.

In the first decade of this century a "block system" was introduced to enhance clash in debates. According to Cowperthwaite and Baird (p. 267), "with this method, all debaters, except the first affirmative speakers, were directed to prepare paragraphs or 'blocks' of arguments on all the conceivably important issues that might arise during a debate. By committing these 'blocks' to memory, the debater could, during the course of the debate, select and assemble such 'blocks' as would result in a direct challenge to the opponents' case. Blocked rebuttal answers were likewise prepared in advance."

Criticism as early as 1913 "led by persons no less prominent than Theodore Roosevelt and William Jennings Bryan, questioned the moral soundness of coaching methods, then prevalent, of requiring college debaters to argue on both sides of a question . . ." (p. 270). Cowperthwaite and Baird go on to note that "educators centered on what many of them thought to be an unhealthy stress upon winning the judges' decisions. Widespread dissatisfaction was expressed over the choice of judges and judging methods." (p. 270)

Concerns for the future of the activity are best directed toward positive suggestions rather than finding satisfaction in defining and celebrating current practices only as negative.

[9]Increased availability of information alone has made debate a different activity. It will not be long until computer storage and computer information searches will be a tool of every debater. Already many squads are employing the computer for evidence storage and block composition. A couple of squads are even experimenting with portable terminals, carried to tournaments, to enable immediate data access.

[10]NDT and CEDA have encouraged publications in national forensics journals and numerous convention programs which have contributed to our understanding of debate and argument. Often these efforts are preceeded and stimulated by practices in actual debates. The gamesmanship of "paradigms" in NDT debate has, for example, enabled the examination of the various conditions necessary for assent to an argument. Considerations of burdens of proof, presumption and the functions of propositions within various "argument fields" has been instructive.

[11]Minutes, "National Debate Tournament Committee Open Meeting," February 12, 1982, Northwestern University, p. 8.

BACK TO BASICS: AN INTERCULTURAL APPROACH TO VALUE PROPOSITION DEBATE

Janet E. Vasilius

University of Arizona

> It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debate.
> - Joubert

While the annals of speech pedagogy are littered with examples of value propositions used for both academic and popular debate, competitive intercollegiate forensics has too often reduced the proposition of value to a lesser status; both theory and practice in recent years has centered upon propositions of policy. Recently there have been efforts to deviate from this policy expectation. The CEDA debate association (redundant phrase) has offered its entrants propositions of value for practice. Meanwhile, various individuals and the CEDA organization itself have tried to remedy the theory vacuum. Yet despite these efforts, value proposition debate has seemed unable to divorce itself from the practices and traditions of "NDT" debate. Is the popularity of CEDA also its nemesis? Must all debate devolve into "fast-talking, evidence-reading sessions with weird analysis and even weirder cases?" (I nearly-quote a colleague here). My own response is that value proposition debate in the CEDA manner is indeed possible, and possible without artificial checks on cases or evidence. I suggest that a cross-cultural perspective can provide an excellent basis for the exploration of value propositions.

Consider an example. The 1979-80 CEDA topic focused on the desirability of requiring a period of national service for all United States citizens. In the main, affirmative teams focused on the need for particular types of national service: military service, public service, even education and tax-paying! While mandatory cardio-pulmonary resuscitation courses or honesty in IRS deductions may seem an odd way to interpret "national service," all such arguments in this line seem an odd way to debate values. You may decide whether something is of value, but not whether something should be held as a value. By placing the emphasis on policy criteria many times removed from values, the values are bypassed, or simply assumed. Territorial integrity for a nation state may be a value, and a value based upon other values, but to consider that value only as translated into arguments on whether the Soviets may or may not be deterred or defeated by our current armed forces does not address the value itself, only the policies surrounding that value. Thus, the emphasis is shifted from consideration of national service, per se, to the present need for a particular type of national service to satisfy a need; the emphasis is shifted from value to policy.

A focus on values, however, may still not be wholly satisfactory. To continue with the same topic used above, the more philosophical and "value oriented" debates I heard were also curiously shallow. In general, these debates involved an overview of the need for a citizen to serve her country, by the affirmative; the negative team would then respond, quoting such sages of Locke and Mill, that such a duty could only be justified in extreme circumstances. The debate would then shift to a consideration of whether such circumstances were sufficiently extreme. The idea of values is identified with philosophy or abstraction, a view not necessarily accurate, and the whole once

again focuses on policy. As I will discuss below, the problem is not merely the policy focus, but the shallow, culturally limited value discussion.

Somewhat belatedly, I must admit that there is no harm in treating value propositions as policy propositions. If those in CEDA wish to label their propositions one thing and treat them as another, no little brains will become particularly warped. In am distressed at the use of those same argumentative constructs as are used to test policies, to test values. There seems to be an opportunity cost involved when people unnecessarily limit the scope of their argument.

Although I would never claim that a value should be, or even can be, divorced from its policy implications, such implications need not be the focal point of discussion. A value may be good in and of itself. Courage, for example, is generally held to be a laudable trait, but few would say that it should be an absolute factor for determining behavior. Indeed, such cliches as "Discretion is the better part of valor" suggest that courage should be tempered by wisdom. Yet to argue that we should not value courage because courage alone can lead to foolish action ignores the cultural context of courage and makes the argument shallow and silly.

It is at this point that the vacuum in both theory and practice becomes apparent; the rejection of policy paradigms for value argument gives no clue as to how values <u>should</u> be argued. Debate theory itself may not hold any answer. The narrow, culture-specific manner in which the entire topic is approached may well be the root of the problem. By operating from our current cultural assumptions the only "real life" question in many debates is "does the circumstance fit the criteria?", a path which leads to policy or fact investigation. The criteria themselves are excluded from investigation, as our culture considers them as "given." A quick review of recent topics, such as education, national service, environment or church and state relations should provide examples of how the value was bypassed in favor of criteria-fit.

An alternative strategy is the removal of the debate from its cultural context. For example, while "national service" or "national security" is a value, there are other, competing values. Might global government not be preferable to nation states? Might anarchy not be superior? Does a citizen owe any involuntary duty? Does the individual exist only to serve the state? Or take a more recent topic: should there be a difference between church and state? Does information provide a good or unneeded conflict? Should rulers be decided by majority or salient minority? Such questions evolve around very profound differences in values; differences so profound as to be fundamental. If there is no agreement on the desirability of a nation, there is not likely any agreement on the conditions of national service. If the church and state dichotomy is discarded, involvement by religious groups in the electoral process will be viewed as positive. Thus, although policy questions are still involved, discussion of specific policies is suspended until the underlying values are resolved.

Immediately, three questions spring up: First, policy considerations are still present; second, because some values are so deeply rooted in the American culture, the speaker wishing to counter those values must use a different cultural context to find support for such values; third, such cross-cultural concepts are outside the experience of most American undergraduates, and are also outside the experience of most debate critics.

To provide a circuitous response to these issues, consider my own "operational definition" of values, that is: the beliefs or attitudes which underly policy or behavior. Scant as it may be, such a definition seems to be compatible with more formal definitions. Dale Hample suggests values "are thought to typify both people and cultures by defining proper (or good or acceptable) action and behavior" (1977, p. 106). Ron Matlon insists that "a proposition of value is a qualitative judgement . . ."(1978, p. 195). Bruce Gronbeck suggests value propositions are "intermediates between the world of fact and the world of advice" (1968, p. 31). Writing from an intercultural perspective, L. E. Sarbaugh explains in part that values are "that set of beliefs that pertain to what is important or unimportant, good-bad or right-wrong" (1979, p. 144). Edward Stewart maintains that in defining values "the one feature that is common to all usages is the idea of oughtness" (1972, p. 17). All these definitions support the previous discussion: value is a pre-policy consideration. Thus, by implication, the most appropriate focus for value proposition debate is the pre-policy area.

To return to my three issues, the responses should be fairly apparent. If policy is still present in the debate, fine; the policy consideration is still present, but is not, and should not be, the prime focus. In addition, by shifting away from argument on present policies to universal questions of value, the argument can expand beyond time-specific considerations of immediate need into argument which relies upon logic, philosophy or history rather than current events alone.

On my second question, I welcome the expansion into a cross-cultural pespective. The image of the crude, oblivious, ethnocentric "Ugly American" can apply just as easily to educators and students as to politicians or camera-wielding tourists. If a question demands an answer not found in a student's own cultural milieu, why not go outside that specific culture for the answer? In the case of value propositions, the use of a variety of cultural standpoints allows exploration of the best position, not merely discussion of a position which currently enjoys favor in the United States. A student also need not go past the borders of this country to discover a great variety of cultures which are no less valid because they hold minority views.

The third issue, lack of preparedness, is not a reason to reject cross-cultural efforts, but to expand pedagogy in the area of debate to include both cross-cultural materials, and tools by which a student may explore cultural diversity, rather than merely her own cultural concepts. The second part of this issue, that of judge acceptance, a problem non-unique in this one area. I remain optimistic that any critic is willing to accept a quality argument, whether or not it is unusual; even better, if both teams agree to discard cultural restrictions on argument, the critic will have no option but compliance.

In short, these particular arguments against arguing value propositions from a cross-cultural perspective are in large part arguments in favor of such a perspective. If intercollegiate debate adheres to its goals of encouraging intellectual development, expanding knowledge, aiding analysis and research abilities, expansion into an intercultural approach seems appropriate. CEDA debate, in particular, would seem an appropriate home for argument which demands more thought than evidence.

What does this mean in practical terms? For a start, the hypothesis-testing paradigm is well suited for both value proposition debate and inter-cultural argument (See also Vasilius, 1980). While other currently popular paradigms force comparison between only two values; or analyze values in the context of current policy through either a stock issues or systems analysis framework; a paradigm which encourages debate simply against the resolution is both simple and adaptable. As each team is free to select a strategy without being constricted by policy expectations, the debaters can also free themselves from debating or defending "status quo" American values. In practice, no one need even risk the problems inherent in cultural relativism; rather than argue one value as best, the only question is whether the value expressed in the resolution is good. Thus, the debater may draw on material to support her claims without having to rely on the advantages of a single policy, value system or culture.

At least as pragmatic as paradigm selection is value identification. Inasmuch as certain values are embedded in our own culture, that same culture can prevent examination of these values, and other values, by obscuring the possibilities beyond the accepted belief structure. Take a deceptively simple concept, "Women should be equal to men." Focusing wholly on the values in this statement, the analysis seems simple: women should be equal. The problem comes in defining the underlying policies which would indicate equality. This is because the mainstream American value questions on this issue tend to focus on a pro- or anti-ERA position, in which the policy defines the value. Yet this analysis ignores other, no less valid, options. Positions on this issue range from the view that women cannot and should not be equal to men (because they have no souls, they are impure, they are not intelligent, they are evil); through the egalitarian view of separate but equal; the liberal view that women should be equal to men; the androgynous view that women and men should be equal to each other; to the separatist view that equality is a ridiculous concept due to extreme gender differences; or even the view that women should be superior to men. Some of these views may seem poor at first glance, but such an ethnocentric viewpoint ignores the sophisticated reasoning underlying each view, from the most "reactionary" to the most "radical."

There are many sources which can promote a cross-cultural exploration of values. I will suggest three intercultural texts.

American Cultural Patterns, by Edward Stewart, provides an excellent consideration of general American values. Stewart does that which is difficult for an American; he examines American values from an outsider's perspective. Example: Stewart suggests that the "middle class American thinks of . . . doing as his preferred activity" (p. 17). In that one phrase Stewart gives a rationale not only for general value constructs in the United States, but a cause of the terrible problem argument theorists have with the concept of inherency?! Stewart provides a catalog of both specific and general examples; the use of material oriented toward identification of American values can be an initial step in debating values from a cross-cultural perspective.

A plausible second step is delineation of values found outside the dominant American culture. Harris and Moran suggest many different ways to analyze cultural differences in their business text, Managing Cultural

Differences. One technique divides values into U.S. values, alternative values, and outlines the policy implications. A debater could use this as a model, and construct a similar table delineating mainstream U.S. values, alternative values and their effect on arguments. Sarbaugh provides a complicated taxonomy for classifying cultural differences in Intercultural Communication. Such a taxonomy could aid in classifying values and assessing the degree of difference between conflicting values. On the environment/energy topic, for example, a chart showing the values on each side could be prepared. Each value would then be paired with alternative values, and the degree and nature of incompatibility assessed. The debate could then focus on the areas of disagreement, with each side using value arguments that are in conflict, and not merely tangential.

Finally, evidentiary and analytical support for the cross-cultural value positions would have to be assembled. In this process, the traditional Western forms of linear logic, or the traditional sources of debate evidence may not be the best. Why discard, for example, a source "biased" in favor of Marxism? Are not most U.S. sources normally considered "biased" in favor of capitalism?

This essay, rather obviously, is far too brief for the subject. I would hope to see an extension in practice rather than on paper. Given appropriately worded resolutions, sufficiently interested students and encouraging coaches, an intercultural approach to debating value propositions could well construct not only a productive argumentative basis for propositions of value, but an understanding of cultural diversity as well.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brownlee, Don, ed., 1980, Perspectives on Non-Policy Debate, Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA)

Gronbeck, Bruce, "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal, Spring, 1968

Harris, Phillip R., and Robert T. Moran, 1979, Managing Cultural Differences, Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing

Hample, Dale, "Testing a Model of Value Argument and Evidence," Communication Monographs, June, 1977

Mation, Ron, "Debating Propositins of Value," Journal of the American Forensic Association, Spring 1978

Sarbaugh, L. E., 1979, Intercultural Communication, New Rochelle, New Jersey: Hayden Book Company

Stewart, Edward C., 1972, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, LaGrange Park, Illinois: International Network

Vasilius, Janet M., "The Role of Presumption in Value Proposition Debate," Paper for the Desert Invitational Tournament Argumentation Symposium, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, March, 1980 (also in Brownlee, above)

THE PROCESS OF VALUING AS A TEST OF THE EXISTENCE OF A VALUE CLAIM

Don R. Swanson

California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Debaters arguing propositions of value sometimes find the analysis of those propositions to be a confounding experience because of confusion over what constitutes a value. Between experts, there is only limited agreement on how a value should be defined.

> The meaning of the term value is by no means clear in the social sciences of in philosophy (Macmillan & Kneller, 1964; Superka, Ahrens & Hedstrom, 1976). There is no consensus for definition. About the only agreement that emerges is that a value represents something important in human existence. Perhaps because it is such a pivotal term, each school of thought invests the word with its own definition.[1]

For example, Jung's analytic theory views value as an amount of psychic energy that can have an impact on behavior.

> Value is a measure of intensity. When we speak of placing a high value upon a particular idea or feeling, we mean that the idea or feeling exerts a considerable force in instigating and directing behavior. A person who values truth will expend a great deal of energy in the search for it. One who places great value upon power will be highly motivated to obtain power. Conversely, if something is of trivial value it will have little energy attached to it.[2]

Maslow wrote of the "Difficulty with the Word 'Values'" when he indicated that:

> 'Values' are defined in many ways, and mean different things to different people. As a matter of fact, it is so confusing semantically that I am convinced we will soon give up this catchall word in favor of more precise and more operational definitions for each of the many submeanings that have been attached to it.[3]

The operational definitions Maslow envisions may be within the purview of the behavioral scientists who work with techniques of "values clarification." Their task is to assist persons to discover what they value. The method they employ is "the process of valuing."[4] This theory asserts that rather than taking the popular position of values influencing behavior, from a theory such as the previously stated Jungian analysis, that it is most useful to discover how persons behave in determining what they value. If the behavior, the process of valuing, is complete, then the observer can be assured that a value has been identified.

The process of valuing is defined by Raths, Harmin, and Simon with seven requirements that must be satisfied for something to be labeled as a value.[5] The requirements are as follows:

"1. Choosing freely." When there is something significant enough for it to guide behavior, it is probably something that has been freely chosen. Coercion is the absence of choice. Coerced choices seldom result in values. It is unlikely that something will be valued to a high degree if the selection of it was predetermined, coerced, or nonexistent.

"2. Choosing from alternatives." Value theorists believe that the greater the range of options open to a person, the greater will be her commitment to the option ultimately selected. Choosing from a range of options

increases the likelihood that the choice represents a value. This requirement should be appealing to debate coaches since it is analogous to the theory applied in brainstorming a variety of options for case analysis. A debater should feel most confident with a case that has resulted from analyzing and rejecting a range of case approaches, in favor of the selected case analysis.

"3. Choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative." Rath, Harmin and Simon feel that a value must emerge in a "context of understanding:"

> For a value to guide a person's life intelligently and meaningfully, we believe it must emerge in a context of understanding. Only when the consequences of each of the alternatives are understood and considered is a choice not impulsive or thoughtless. There is an important cognitive factor here. The more we understand about the consequences that flow from each alternative, the more we can make an informed choice, a choice that flows from our full intelligence. Thus, we prefer to exclude from the term values those choices not making a full use of intelligence.[6]

"4. Prizings and cherishing." That which is a value carries a positive connotation in the sense that it not only makes a person happy, but it is probably also prized, cherished, respected and esteemed. In a broad sense we judge that which we value in a positive manner.

"5. Affirming." A value is something a person is willing to talk about. When asked to relate to that value choice there is a tendency for the person to be proud of the choice and to advocate for it. Values are often apparent because of the rhetoric of the person or persons possessing the value, i.e., the value is expressed.

"6. Acting upon choices." A value becomes a motivator that guides behavioral choices. This requirement is distinct from the previous requirement of affirming the choice. It is possible to speak positively of something that is labeled as a value, but not take action on it. Everyone is familiar with persons who advocate certain choices and fail to behaviorally make those choices themselves. Therefore a value is both rhetorical and behavioral. A true value affects lives because it directs actions.

"7. Repeating." It is unlikely that something is a value if it only effects a person's life once. "Values tend to be persistent."[7] Values tend to appear as a pattern in a person or group's existence.

These seven requirements may be applied as criteria to establish whether or not the process of valuing is occurring. The seven requirements can be easily summarized with three dimensions. The first is the developmental dimension represented by the questions which present the first three requirements. These requirements deal with how the value is selected and developed. Rath, Harmin and Simon label these as the elements of the process of "choosing." The second dimension is the rhetorical dimension. The rhetorical dimension is clarified by requirements 4 and 5 that query how the valuer thinks, feels and expresses the value. The theorists label these requirements simply as "prizing." The third dimension is the behavioral dimension that asks, in requirements 6 and 7, if the value is determining behaviors. Rath, Harmin and Simon call this process "acting." The following figure represents the dimensions and the seven requirements:

THE PROCESS OF VALUING

SEVEN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A VALUE

If the following questions can be answered affirmatively, a value exists.

DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSION	1. Was the value chosen freely?
"Choosing"	2. Was the value chosen from a range of alternatives?
	3. Was the value chosen after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative?
RHETORICAL DIMENSION	4. Is the value prized and cherished?
"Prizing"	5. Is the value expressed and affirmed?
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION	6. Is the value guiding behavior?
"Acting"	7. Is the value repeatedly guiding behavior?

The process of valuing paradigm is a definitional theory that CEDA debaters may find applicable to some value oriented propositions. The following two examples are an attempt to simplistically illustrate how the process of valuing might apply.

The Cross Examination Debate Association came close to selecting the following topic for its proposition for debate during the second semester 1982-83. "Resolved: that the Puritan work ethic has been an overemphasized American value." A central issue in debating this proposition would undoubtedly be whether or not American workers valued the "Puritan work ethic." After defining the "Puritan work ethic" the debate advocate could apply "the process of valuing" paradigm to determine if the value was extant. If the affirmative advocate could prove that the "Puritan work ethic" did not fit the seven requirements for the existence of a value, then the inference could be drawn and developed that the "Puritan work ethic has been an overemphasized American value."

The second semester 1982-83 CEDA debate topic dealt with "individual rights of privacy" being "more important than any other constitutional right." Some teams asserted that privacy was an important value to the American public because a Harris Poll presented that result based on their interviews. With the application of the seven requirements for the process of valuing, it is apparent that the public opinion polling technique only fits one of the seven requirements. The polling technique measures the fifth requirement of expressing and affirming, but it does not measure the other requirements. Consequently the negative can argue that the Harris Poll is insignificant in the debate because it does not adequately establish individual rights of privacy as a value that meets the requirements of the process of valuing.

There is some controversy among behavioral scientists regarding the process of valuing concept. Some theorists feel the process of valuing is too stringent. They submit that the seven requirements are so extensive that the concept restrictively narrows the concept of valuing. This is precisely the intent of Rath, Harmin and Simon however, as they wish to imbue the label "value" with a substantial referent. They believe that things are often called "values" that are "value indicators" that do not meet all the criteria.[8] A list of "value indicators" includes: "goals or purposes, aspirations, attitudes, interests, feelings, beliefs and convictions, activities, and worries, problems and obstacles."[9] A "value indicator" may lead to the growth of a true value, but should not be confused with the true value that meets all seven criteria. This theory is particularly relevant to value debate since debaters have tended to label any sort of value indicator as a "value."

NOTES

[1]Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and Teaching, (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1978), p. 8.

[2]Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, (New York: John Wiley, 1970), p. 93.

[3]Abraham H. Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 110.

[4]Raths, p. 8.

[5]Raths, pp. 26-27

[6]Raths, p. 27.

[7]Raths, p. 28.

[8]Raths, p. 29.

[9]Ibid.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AS PARADIGMS FOR VALUE DEBATE

Walter Ulrich
University of Alabama

The recent use of value-oriented topics by CEDA has stimulated a great deal of interest in value argument.[1] While policy debate often involves a questioning of values and frequently addresses the issue of how values should be weighed, value topics have focused the attention of many individuals on the nature of value inquiry, which has been neglected by many contemporary debate theorists.[2] While much has been written on value topics in the past few years, many theorists have simply attempted to transpose rules from policy debate to value debate without recognizing that value debate differs in some very fundamental ways from policy debate.[3] Value debate seems to be searching for a new paradigm to assist in guiding debaters and judges in the evaluation of value debate and to help organize argument on value topics.[4] This paper will examine four dominant themes in the CEDA literature that attempt to establish paradigms for value debate, analyzing the weaknesses of each approach. It will then argue that we need to promote a wider range of paradigms to evaluate value argument based on various philosophical systems.

Current Paradigms for Value Debates

There are four dominant philosophies of value debate that have emerged in recent years.[5] The first view suggests that any evaluation of values should be based on current social values. The second view, drawing from Zarefsky's work on hypothesis testing, suggests that presumption is always against the value implied by the resolution. The third view suggests that the values of the individual judge should be presumed to be valid until a reason is given to discard those views. The final approach, drawn from Utilitarianism, assumes that the value that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number of people should be promoted. While each of these views has some value, they reflect a limited view of the nature of value disputes.

The first view suggests that we should judge action and values according to contemporary values.[6] Debaters are expected to locate the current values that Americans share, and they are then asked to related those values to the topic under discussion.[7] The assumption is made that current values reflect what should be our values.

This view reflects an inappropriate view of the way that values should be evaluated.[8] Initially, it is often difficult to evaluate precisely what are the dominant American values, especially since America contains many diverse cultures.[9] Additionally, just because Americans may share a value does not mean that we should hold that value. Long ago Hume observed that what is is not always what should be. Contemporary values are not necessarily the correct values. Argumentation theorists have long recognized the fallacies of the appeal to tradition and the fallacy of the appeal to popular opinion,[10] which is the basis for this view of value. This view could also lead to absurd conclusions. For example, if we were debating in Germany during World War II,

then genocide could be justified since the German culture at the time sanctioned those actions.

If we were debating in the South in the early 1800's, the institution of slavery would be seen as having a value. Even today, many individuals are attacking current values. Liberals attack our values as being too conservative. Others attack our values as being too self-centered. The Moral Majority attacks contemporary values as being too immoral. It is simplistic to view existing values as being inherently the best values; rather we need to seek ways to evaluate claims about what our values should be.

The second approach to the examination of values is the hypothesis testing approach. This view was developed by David Zarefsky[11] and has been extended to value debate by several individuals.[12] The assumption behind hypothesis testing is that the value specified in the resolution acts as a hypothesis to be tested, and that we should accept that value only if we are sure that the value is correct. Thus, presumption is against the resolution, and the negative team can suggest multiple counter-values that could be superior to the value in the resolution. This insures a rigorous test of the resolution.

This view of debate is inadequate for a number of reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. The statement that value debate should be evaluated as a hypothesis is, in itself, a hypothesis (or else there is no way hypothesis testing can be applied outside the debate setting). This requires that all supporters of hypothesis testing demonstrate the <u>inherent</u> superiority of hypothesis testing over all other judging philosophies, which would be difficult to do, especially since Zarefsky himself argues that a diversity of paradigms should be used by debaters.[13]

Second, hypothesis testing is an inappropriate model for value debate. One assumption behind hypothesis testing is that debate is a search for the truth. The truth, in an absolute sense, is impossible to establish. Philosophers have argued for centuries about the nature of values and ethical inquiry and still have not reached a conclusion on these topics. It is unreasonable to expect debaters to discover and prove this truth in one hour. Instead, we must seek a truth that is less than absolute.[14] The level of truth that is acceptable cannot be established by a universal, arbitrary standard; rather it must be established by comparing the systems of value evaluation that are suggested by the advocates in the debate. This is the method of science. Zarefsky bases his theory of hypothesis testing on his vision of the nature of argument in science, and the only scientist he cites is Kuhn. Kuhn, however, does not share Zarefksy's view of argument. Kuhn argues, for example:

> Once a first paradigm through which to view nature has been found, there is no such thing as research in the absence of any paradigm. To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself.[15]

Presumption, according to Kuhn, is not against any paradigm; indeed, once a paradigm has been proposed, presumption is with that paradigm until another paradigm is proposed. Kuhn argues "once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative

candidate is available to take its place."[16] Nor does Kuhn argue that a paradigm is evaluated against all alternative theories; Kuhn argues that science has advanced by the "competition between two rival paradigms for the allegiance of the scientific community."[17] This is even more applicable for scientific disputes. As individuals, we are faced with choices every minute of every day. To fail to make those choices is to fail to face the responsibilities of being human. Just as one cannot not communicate, we cannot fail to have a moral and an ethical system, even if the system is not a conscious product of thought. To reject one system of values is to tacitly accept another system which may be inferior to the system that was articulated. To suspend judgement is not an option; it is to tacitly accept current values that may not be articulated or defended by any advocate. In our efforts to avoid accepting a false conclusion, we may set our standards so high that we fail to embrace a true value.[18] For all of these reasons, hypothesis testing does not appear to be an adequate theory to apply to value argument.

A third approach to the judging of value arguments holds that judges should evaluate debates from the ethical perspective that the judge personally supports.[19] Thus, the judge is allowed to permit his or her personal bias on the resolution guide him or her in establishing presumption and in selecting the winner. This position suffers from several weaknesses. It is often impossible to know exactly what is the bias of the judge. In addition, this view of debate is contrary to the notion of a neutral judge. In fact, it encourages dogmatic judges. For example, if I believe there is no justification for violating individual liberty, I would never vote for a team that is forced by the resolution to argue that individual liberty is not absolute. This is unfair to the teams involved, since my decision would be based on a factor outside the control of the debaters.

A final approach to the judging of value debate is the Utilitarian approach to debate.[20] This approach argues that a value is justified if, on balance, the advantages of that value outweigh the disadvantages of that value. While there may be some basis for this view of judging debates, it should be recognized that the Utilitarian viewpoint is only one of many philosophies that have been advocated by philosophers. As with the first approach to judging value debates, this position has been attacked by many individuals.[21] Some argue that it is impossible to weigh values, or that this view tends to emphasize benefits to the majority over the rights of the minority. Others argue that there are some rights or moral obligations that do not fit into the Utilitarian matrix. My argument is not that there is no use for a Utilitarian framework; it is simply to note that the theory is just one of many theories on how values should be established.

I recently saw a debate that illustrated this limitation. The second negative speaker presented a disadvantage that was developed with extensive references to Ayn Rand. The disadvantage argued that the sole purpose of government was to protect property rights and that the plan would curtail these rights. The affirmative team, arguing from a Utilitarian perspective, pressed the negative team to quantify the impact of the disadvantage. I think that

they missed the thrust of the argument. The position was (or should have been) not that you should place Rand's value in a Utilitarian matrix, but rather it was that the judge should judge the round as if the judge were Ayn Rand. From that perspective, the issue is not how to weigh the disadvantage; rather one would view the proposed action as being outside the power of a legitimate government and one would rule out the plan regardless of its consequences. This would be true for other philosophical systems. A devout Christian, for example, would not base the decision on whether or not to sin on the cost/benefit analysis of the action; another rule would govern the action.

Alternative Paradigms for Value Debate

The weaknesses of current paradigms of value dispute is that they have attempted to develop their assumptions from policy debate. A much more logical approach to value debate is to draw more from philosophy. This would indicate that a large number of potential paradigms are available to the advocate. All philosophical systems attempt to develop standards for determining what is good and what is not, and thus each system is a potential paradigm for a value debate. Debaters should read Mill, Rawls and Dworkin to develop a framework for analyzing values, and they should realize the implications of these theorists in debate rounds. For example, if a topic requires that arguers evaluate an ethical problem, there are a large number of perspectives that could be used to support a conclusion on the topic. If a debater operates under Utilitarian assumptions, then the action would be justified based upon the ends of the action; the ends would justify the means. If the arguer were to operate under the Judeo-Christian ethical system, the problem would be solved based upon an interpretation of the Bible. If the judge was an egoist, the decision would be based upon what was in the interests of the individual judge. Depending upon the wording of the topic, the theories of Mill, Hume, Locke, Spinoza, or Rawls might be used to create an ethical system that is then applied to the dispute in question. A team might defend a liberal view of the world to justify a value in one round, and defend anarchy or Marxism in another round. The resolution of the round would depend in part on the worldview that the judges accept; current debate theories would be only a small part of the wide range of paradigms that would be open to a debater.

This view of value debate would call for some major changes to be made in the way debaters argue value topics. The debate would consist of three sets of arguments. First, each advocate would outline the ethical (or political or social) system that they wish to defend, outlining its central features. Second, each team would explain why their paradigm should be used in that debate. It is possible that both teams may agree on the philosophical system to be used in the round. If this were the case, that paradigm would locate presumption and provide guidelines for resolving arguments.[22] If a Utilitarian paradigm were used, for example, the judge would simply weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the value that are argued in the round. If an anarchist perspective is used, then presumption would be against government involvement. A natural law perspective would argue that the ends of a law may be irrelevant if the means are contrary to natural law. The paradigm chosen would provide guidelines to help set standards to evaluate the values.

If the two teams disagree on the philosophical system to be utilized, then a portion of the debate should be devoted to comparing the two paradigms to allow the judge the decide which of the two paradigms is superior to the other. Unless there is some agreement on the philosophical system to be used in the debate, the debate is unlikely to be productive, since evidence and arguments that may be persuasive to one philosophical viewpoint may be of no relevance to a person from another philosophical perspective.[23] If I am an extremely religious individual, for example, utilitarian claims will be irrelevant to my value system, while an appeal to the Bible would carry no force for a Utilitarian. Debaters thus must demonstrate that their view of the world is superior to the alternate philosophical system advocated by their opposition. They can do this by reducing their opponent's position to an absurdity, or by noting that their system is superior since it is more complete, comprehensive, consistent, etc., or they can use any other means of logical persuasion to establish their paradigm as being superior. The judge would then be forced to decide which position, as argued in the round, is the superior philosophical system and, once that has been decided, the judge would then adopt that system as a paradigm for the evaluation of the value argument. The judge would thus apply the philosophical system to the arguments in the round to decide if the statement of value implied in the resolution would be true or false for an individual accepting the philosophical position advocated who heard the arguments in the round.

This approach to debating values may call for a shift in the responsibilities of speakers in CEDA debate. The first negative speaker, for example, may wish to devote part of that speech to developing an alternative philosophical system from the system implied by the affirmative case. The speaker would then indicate why the negative paradigm is superior to the affirmative paradigm. In addition, he would indicate why, given the negative paradigm, the value implied in the resolution is false. The second negative speaker could then devote that entire speech to indicating why, even if the judge were to accept the affirmative team's value system, the resolution should be rejected. The affirmative team may want to respond to this strategy by devoting more of its time to articulating and justifying the philosophical position that forms the basis for their case.

This view of value argumentation will enable debaters to more fully recognize the assumptions that they make in arguing values, and it will also place those assumptions under critical examination. It will also help debaters (and coaches) to learn more about values. It is absurd to think that our debaters could debate values for four years without even knowing what Natural Law or Utilitarianism refer to (or what the strengths or weaknesses of these views are). If we are interested in training students about philosophy, we need to draw more from philosophers and we need to help our students understand the major ethical and political theories so that they can compare these systems and apply these systems to contemporary disputes over values. CEDA debate is the ideal way to conduct this exploration, and if CEDA moves in this direction, the only result can be a greater understanding of philosophical systems and values by both debaters and coaches.

NOTES

[1]See Ronald J. Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14 (Spring, 1978), 194-204; Don Brownlee, ed., Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1980); Don Brownlee, ed., Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of CEDA (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1981); and George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981).

[2]See Michael R. Hagan, "A Missing Chapter in Argumentation Texts," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 9 (Summer, 1972), 274-278.

[3]See, for example, Don Brownlee, "Advocacy and Values," Forensic, 65 (January, 1980), 4-7, and Barbara Warnick, "Arguing Value Propositions," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Fall, 1981), 109-119.

[4]For the importance of paradigms in conducting research, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). The application of paradigms to debate is discussed in Robert C. Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Winter, 1982), 133-140.

[5]A discussion of the first three views of value debate can be found in Matlon, pp.199-200.

[6]This view is supported by Warnick (p.113) and Matlon ("Propositions of Value: An Inquiry into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption," in Dimensions of Argument, p. 499).

[7]Edward D. Steele, "Social Values in Public Address," Western Speech, 22 (Winter, 1958), 38-42, and Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding, "The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion," Western Speech, 26 (Spring, 1962), 83-91.

[8]See, for example, Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal, 19 (1968), 33.

[9]Jan Vasilius, "Presumption, Presumption, Wherefore Art Thou, Presumption," in Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument, pp.36, 38.

[10]W. Ward Fearnside and William B. Holder, Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 89-97.

[11]David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," in Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1979), pp. 427-437. For a critique of Zarefsky, see Robert Rowland, "Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation," in Dimensions of Argument, pp. 448-475, and Kenneth M. Strange, "An Advocacy Paradigm of Debate," presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, November 13, 1981.

[12]See Vasilius, pp. 33-42, and Michael Bartanen, "The Criteria for a Good CEDA Debate Resolution: Some Problems, Implications," Forensic, 67 (1981), 16-19.

[13]David Zarefsky, "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Winter, 1982), 144. Hypothesis testing is also inconsistent in its view of motivational inherency. If any advocate must address the motives behind a problem, then hypothesis testers must be able to explain why all judges (presumably rational individuals) are not hypothesis testers. (see David Zarefsky, "The Role of Causal Argument in Policy Discussion," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (1977), 179-191.

[14]See Walter Ulrich, "Argument as Tragedy," unpublished paper, University of Alabama, 1981.

[15]Kuhn, p. 79.

[16]Kuhn, p. 77.

[17]Kuhn, p. 145.

[18]Social science has long distinguished between a type I error (rejecting a true null hypothesis) and a type II error (accepting a false null hypothesis). Zarefsky arbitrarily decides that a type I error is more serious, while it is equally possible to suggest that a type II error is more serious, in which case presumption should be for the resolution.

[19]Raymond Zeuchner and Charlene Arnold Hill, "Psychological Presumption: Its Place in Value Topic Debate," in Philosophy and Practice of CEDA, pp. 20-24. For a criticism of this approach, see Randolph J. Scott and Tony Wynn, "Avoidance of the False Claim: Some Considerations for Debating and Judging Propositions of Value," in Philosophy and Practice of CEDA, pp. 25-26.

[20]See Beverly Merrill Kelley, "An Alternative to NDT Debate," in Philosophy and Practice of CEDA, p. 12.

[21]For a criticism of Utilitarianism, see J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Michael D. Bayles, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, N.Y.: Ancor Books, 1968); James M. Smith and Ernest Sosa, eds., Mill's Utilitarianism: Text and Criticism (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969); and Samuel Gorovitz, ed., Mill: Utilitarianism: Text and Critical Essays (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971). Any other philosophical system would implicitly provide attacks on Utilitarianism by suggesting other values besides utilitarian values exist.

[22]See G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Liberal and Conservative Presumptions: On Political Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument," in Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Annandale: Speech Communication Association, 1980), pp. 304-337.

[23]For a discussion of argument between philosophical systems, see the works of Henry Johnstone, especially Philosophy and Argument (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), and Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument: An Outlook in Transition (University Park, Pa.: Dialogue Press, 1978).

REMEMBERING WHAT THE C.E. STANDS FOR:
TOWARD A GREATER ROLE FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION IN CEDA DEBATE

Rob Norton
University of California, Riverside

One of the motives for creating an alternative to NDT in college debating was to provide the opportunity for debaters to test the arguments of their opponents under direct examination. Indeed, when CEDA debated questions of policy for an entire season, the presence of cross-examination in CEDA and not in NDT was one of the major differences between the two styles of debating.[1]

However, the role of cross-examination in CEDA debating seems to have remained in CEDA's "new name for novice" days and does not seem to have progressed as fast or as far as other elements of CEDA debating. It is atypical for any given cross-examination period to result in information that changes the outcome of a round. More generally, cross-examination has become "prep-time in drag,"[2] a period where one partner asks for the opportunity to examine or re-read materials while the other, paying little or no attention, prepares for the next constructive. It does not seem unfair to say that cross-examination, one third of all the speaking periods in a debate, is, more often than not, a waste of time.

Part of the problem is that skillful use of cross-examination tends to come fairly late in a speaker's development. Effective cross-examination often requires the ability to see the debate round as a whole, to plan ahead on the basis of what one has researched and what has already been argued. It is unrealistic to expect novices, for example, to be very effective in cross-exam.

To our credit, debate coaches are aware of this problem and have been making efforts to correct it. Several exhaustive treatments of cross-examination skills are in print.[3] While room for improvement exists, the information needed to help debaters make themselves better examiners already exists.[4]

The point of this paper is that we need to attack the problem of improving the use of cross-examination on another front. What cross-examination means to the debate as a whole is still unclear. While a critical admission in the cross-exam is known to be something, that if used in the next speech, could be damaging to one's opponents, the less obvious roles of cross-examination remain unexamined in debate theory. The purpose of this paper is to pose five questions about the role of cross-examination and provide one debate coach's view of their answers. Cross-examination is allowed to become "prep-time in drag" in part because how it fits into the debate as a whole is unclear. The following five questions go to that issue.

ONE: IS CROSS-EXAMINATION SPECIFIC?

In the courtroom, cross-examination is limited to the examination of the statements the witness made under direct examination and/or his credibility in making them. In debate, I am asking, is cross-examination limited to the constructive it follows. It is a frequent experience for 1ACs to be asked what the 2AC plans to argue or for the 2NC to be asked about issues on the case when his arguments were "off case." The speaker under cross-examination will often claim to be unaware, either because 2AC is in the future at that point or "I'm

second negative, I don't know anything about case." My question is whether their implied insistence on focusing examination on what they just argued is legitimate.

I would answer that, for the most part, we should not hold cross-exam to be limited to the previous constructive and we should expect debaters to function as a team, with both partners aware of the other's doings. It is interesting how many of these 2NCs who claim to have no idea of what is being argued on case are certain that important arguments were undenied when it comes time to do 2NR. We should allow a questioner to ask any reasonable question about any issue in the round and expect either partner to be able to explain it. If they do not or can not, that would become valid basis for reduced speaker points or, possibly, the ballot itself.

TWO: IS CROSS-EXAMINATION CONSTRUCTIVE?

By this question I mean to ask if issues discussed in cross-examination, but not argued in a constructive, are new arguments in rebuttal if argued in a rebuttal. If cross-examination is part of the constructive process of creating arguments for discussion in the rebuttals, then an argument in rebuttals based on cross-examination would not be new and should be answered on its merits.

I think the answer to this question is clearly that cross-examination should be considered part of the constructive process. My first reason is that, unless considered as such, the cross-exam of the 2NC would become worthless. There is no constructive left, at that point in the debate, and the affirmative deserves the right to use whatever they can discover in cross-exam. Secondly, our style of debating puts an unfair burden on the 1AR. To answer two speeches in one at "CEDA-speed" is an almost impossible burden. Allowing 1AR to use issues developed in cross-exam, however, would make a significant contribution towards both equity for that speaker and making CEDA's goal of debate at reasonable delivery speeds possible. Finally, nothing would encourage the discussion of substantive issues, rather than just evidence reading, in cross-exam like the very real possibility that such discussion would be used later. It would be very much in the debater's interest to ask, and answer, more specifically.

THREE: IS CROSS-EXAMINATION EXHAUSTIVE?

By this question I mean to ask if, just as we discourage argumentation in cross-examination, we should discourage more questioning during the speeches. The "pimp and press" approach, wherein an argument is answered, not with substantive clash, but with a list of "nit-pick" questions, is fairly common. It is often the resort of a team that lacks a good answer to offer four or more questions and hope the argument goes away. "Pimp and press" is not good debating and there is no need to preserve it. One good way to eliminate such approaches is to regard cross-examination as exhaustive of questioning. If the next speaker can refer "pimp and press" questions to cross-examination, there will be a natural focus on areas where good reasons can prevail. We should encourage debaters to leave argumentation out of cross-exam and non-responsive questions out of the speeches.

FOUR: IS CROSS-EXAMINATION COMPULSORY?

Cross-examination has become so obviously "prep-time in drag" that an occasional team will request that cross-exam be waived and three additional minutes of pre-time awarded. My question here is whether we should allow that

or require a team that is not eager to do a cross-examination to do one. I'm inclined to answer that we should allow a team to use as much or as little cross-examination time as they see fit, but that we should not award additional preparation time in place of cross-exam. If debaters don't wish to take advantage of cross-exam, fairness to their opponents and their audience dictates that we should return the time to the tournament. While I would reward a team that recognizes it has asked what it needs in less than three minutes and sits down, I would punish a team that thinks so little of reasoned discourse that preparation time is more important than even re-reading evidence. However, I would limit the penalty to the three minutes involved. Debate is an example of freedom of speech at its best and freedom to speak is also freedom not to speak but we should not create incentives not to cross-examine.

FIVE: WHEN IS CROSS-EXAMINATION BINDING?

For cross-examination to be meaningful, the answers given therein must be binding on the team that gave them. Cross-exam would quickly become a farce if a team could make any answer and retract it at will. However, the holding that cross-examination answers are binding raises the question of the point at which they become so. Mis-speaking is a common human experience and it seems too harsh a rule to hold that a cross-examination answer is binding at the point that it is uttered. Since speakers are often unaware of having mis-spoken, a holding that answers are binding at the conclusion of the cross-examination period would be almost as harsh. I would hold that a cross-examination answer is binding at the point of use by the other team. If 1AC gives an incorrect answer and 1NC make a good-faith argument on the basis of that answer, 2AC should not be able to announce that it was all a mistake and ignore the 1NC argument. However, if 1AC gives an incorrect answer and 1NC, face-down in preparation, ignores it, 2AC should be allowed to correct the error. Cross-examination answers are for use in speeches, if never used, the answers are worthless, save only as an aid to understanding. I don't see a great deal of hardship imposed by requiring teams to act promptly if cross-exam gives them something they can use.

Excellence in cross-examination is one of the most vital skills offered by college debate. Cross-examination is most like argumentation outside of debating, wherein timed speeches and elaborate theory constructs are absent. We do a disservice to debaters if we don't make them able to ask and answer questions with skill, and only by clarifying and expanding the role of cross-examination can that essential learning be given the maximum chance to take place.

NOTES

[1]An affirmation of the value of cross-examination is found in the fact that shortly after CEDA came into being, NDT adopted cross-examination debating as well.

[2]"Prep-time in drag" is the author's own term for the misuse of cross-exam in this way. Other, and probably better, terms exist.

[3]See, for example, Evan Caminker and Tom Miller's contribution to last year's CEDA YEARBOOK.

[4]Such articles tend to suffer from an over-reliance on law (where cross-exam is of much longer time, under oath, and of witnesses rather than advocates) and tend to provide "dumbbell" examples of questions and answers that debaters of normal intellect rarely fall into.

WE OUGHT TO BE AFRAID OF "SHOULD" BUT SHOULD WE BE AFRAID OF "OUGHT?"

Raymond Bud Zeuschner
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

While I doubt that Franklin Roosevelt thought very much about college debate, I feel his observation that, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," could apply to many of our actions in CEDA. We make decisions often on the basis of an *ad populum* appeal to fear -- "that sounds like NDT! Heavens!" and the idea is rejected. Indeed, we may be able to profit from the experience of our brethern who spend their time in policy debates. One such lesson may come in the form of learning how to phrase debatable topics. Nothing has caused more frustration and more unsatisfying debates than our topic phrasing. In our fear of sounding "policy-ish" we religiously avoid "should" in our topics. Thus, we get stuck with "is" -- perhaps a worse fate.

In debate after debate over the years, I have had the meaning of "is" debated for me, when I really wanted to hear about the substantive issues involved. Does "is" mean just for now? Is there a future "is?" Is there a past "is?" I have been told there is an eternal "is" - i.e., "Jesus is Lord!" which clearly does not mean for the hour of the debate round, but stretching at least infinitely forward, and probably backwards as well when used by people to express their faith. I have heard attorneys complain after hearing one of these nonsense discussions, "Why are they quibbling over the verb and ignoring the substance?" I did not have a very good answer.

If we are serious about debating about values, and doing what Zaretsky calls, "value comparisons"[1] then we need to adopt a perspective formally which matches the one most of us share informally. We need to be judgemental in our topics to alleviate the present tense of "is." We cannot depend on such winners as "desirable" to get to the judgement, because the verb still ties the judgement to a possible time frame. When we debated the "Energy vs. Environment" topic, many a team tried to support the proposition as a claim of fact -- energy IS more important than the environment, when most of us were listening for debates which would support a rationale for placing one or the other on a higher value plane -- which one should be more important? Try that for a proposition -- "Resolved: that Energy needs should be more important than Environmental protection." Say it aloud. That didn't hurt, did it? Does anyone seriously think that this phrasing mandates a munificently funded board of self-perpetuating experts who have all necessary information, being removed only for mis-mal- or non- ? The reason we may feel uneasy is because of the convention governing the use of "should" in intercollegiate debate. Our general audiences would be perfectly happy to hear a value debate with the above phrasing, yet we have been so trained by our tradition, that we see the word, "should" and immediately elbow-jerk to the flip side of the flow for the plan.

Take the Spring 1983 topic (please!), "Resolved: That the individual right of privacy is more important than any other Constitutional right." And

so, in quarter-finals I hear the elegant argument, "Do you mean March 1983 'is' or for the whole decade, or for the whole of Western Civilization 'is'?" EGAD. I want to listen about privacy and the constitutional protections and instead I get semantic gyrations about the verb. S.I. Hayakawa observed that "is" is probably one of the most dangerous words in our language, except when used as an auxiliary verb. He may be right on this one. So how do we get out of the trivia often called for with "is" and avoid the pernicious connotations of "should?" As I am a victim of my training, I have a plan.

We could simply appropriate the word "ought" as a CEDA convention. "Resolved: That the individual right of privacy ought to be more important than other Constitutional rights." "Resolved: That Energy ought to be more important than Environment." Immediately, several things happen to our advantage.

First, we weigh the relative merits or values involved about adopting the proposition, not whether or not the proposition itself is a question of fact or value. Secondly, presumption can be immediately assigned back to the negative if we do our phrasing correctly, and the judgement as to whether or not the affirmative is prima facie becomes easier.

"Ought" is helpful, although often found to be synonymous with "should," it does not have that connotation or convention in the world of debate. Even better, in the world of dictionary, "ought" is filled with value overtones. Webster's New World Dictionary gives us, "an auxiliary used with the infinitives of various verbs to express: 1. obligation or duty: as, he ought to pay his debts. 2. desirability: as, you ought to eat more slowly. 3. expectancy or probability: as, I ought to be through by Monday."[2] Notice that none of these have the specificity attached in our minds of "should" and the conditional tense is expressed directly. Webster underscores the relevance to our value-orientation with the #2 definition - desirability. A look to the World Book Encyclopedia Dictionary gives us "1. to have a duty, to be obliged, 2. to be right or suitable, 3. to be wise, 4. to be expected, 5. to be very likely."[3] And if that is not enough, let me turn to Black's, where we find, ". . . although generally directory only, will be taken as mandatory if the context requires it."[4] which does not define the word at all, leaving it up to regular or normal dictionary definitions. If we create a context through our intercollegiate practices, we can avoid any problems with interpretation, and focus in on the judgmental, evaluative nature of "ought" defined earlier.

For its major benefit of assigning presumption more clearly and getting us out of the often silly communication of verb tense arguments, I feel that CEDA should indeed change its policy and adopt the one-plank plan offered -- put "ought" into our resolutions.

NOTES

[1]David Zarefsky, "Criteria for Evaluating Non-Policy Argument" in Don Brownlee, ed., Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument, CEDA, 1980.

[2]Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, (College Ed.), World Publishing Co., New York, p. 1039.

[3]The World Book Dictionary, Vol. II, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1979, p. 1473.

[4]Black's Law Dictionary, Henry Campbell Black, Revised Fourth Edition, 1968.

"WHEN YOU BEGIN A DIVISION, NEVER FEED IT TOO MUCH;
SOMETHING MAY HAPPEN, YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT!"
(with apologies to Dr. Seuss)

PRESUMPTION IN THE VALUE PROPOSITION REALM

"A definition whose time has come"

Dwight T. Podgurski
California State University, Northridge

Once upon a time, three blind debate coaches came upon a huge beast that had been feeding on the side of the road. One coach, feeling only the first part of the beast, decided that the beast fit best into a cage of jurisprudence. The second, wanting to test the hypothesis of the beast's existence, thought that they should doubt the existence of the beast altogether until it made a noise in the forest. The third, feeling the historical part of the beast, was sure that it would act much like another beast he had come in contact with before; the policy platypus.

Much confusion has centered around the "beast" examined by most contemporary debate instructors. Policy debate has a full and rich history of theory building to rely upon and to settle questions of argument application in the competitive debate setting. Stock issues including inherency, workability, solvency and topicality have evolved throughout the last several decades to guide the policy debater in choosing appropriate arguments during rounds and in research decisions prior to tournament competition. It is rare in policy debate, even among the novice competitors to find a debater who lacks at least a marginal understanding of "debate theory."

Unfortunately, the relative state of consensus concerning stock issues enjoyed by instructors and students of policy debate is not shared by their counterparts in the value proposition setting. After twelve seasons of CEDA competition, little, if any clarity exists. Debaters continue to cry out "we don't have to have significance/be inherent/run D.A.s/be topical. This is CEDA," as though debating in a nonpolicy realm were a license for irrational thought. On more than one occasion, much to my disdain, debaters have chosen to ignore all previous speeches, analysis and evidence to discuss what they've cleverly labeled "issues." If CEDA debaters are at a loss (if you'll pardon the expression) for quality argumentation, much of the problem can be attributed to the current state of publication dealing with the value proposition realm. One particularly confusing concept is presumption. This paper will serve to offer a unifying paradigm of presumption in an effort to provide clarity and a rational presumption standard. It is hoped that this paper will additionally serve as a useful guide for the competitive CEDA debater who has, in most cases, had to wade headfirst through pages of analysis on Archbishop Whately's view of the legislative world.

Few would suggest that presumption plays no part in competitive debate. Application of Whately's concept was evident well before most coaches were born, although admittedly a few coaches may be possible exceptions. The importance of presumption was well illustrated in the 1963 edition of Decision

by Debate:

> Every debate that ever has or ever will take place concerns, if not an actual, at least a figurative piece of ground. One of the disputants preoccupies-figuratively stands upon-an idea, interpretation, or value that the other thinks he should not be occupying. Indeed, unless some actual or figurative piece of ground is preoccupied, there can be no debate. There is no established order or pattern of relationships that may be challenged. The situation is chaotic or formless and hence not subject to reordering. There is nothing to argue about, no matter concerning which the parties can disagree. For a debate to occur, the occupancy of a piece of ground must be contested . . . The technical term for the preoccupation of a piece of argumentative ground is presumption.[1]

The real question, then, is not whether presumption has a place in debate but rather what role it plays. Often, given the lack of clarity on this issue, value debaters have found it convenient to borrow theory from successful policy debaters. The text Public Policy Decision Making explains the position most adopted by policy debaters: "The legislative counterpart of presumption is primarily an administrative concept. The assumption favors present policies simply because it takes time and energy to change those policies, not because those policies are assumed correct.[2] In many cases, affirmative teams in value debate will argue presumption from a legislative paradigm claiming that since the affirmative case defends values and/or systems which exist currently, the affirmative team should therefore receive the benefit of presumption and the negative the burden of proof. This strategy, however, is not a particularly viable one. The legislative paradigm is truly applicable only in a policy setting.

Value propositions, although occasionally requiring a policy evaluation, do not explicitly require a policy comparison. In addition, since neither the affirmative or negative is required to advocate a uniquely advantageous policy not currently in existence, neither the affirmative or the negative need to feel compelled to abandon the status quo. In some cases, the 1983 CEDA resolution for example, the affirmative and negative are both required to defend the status quo in order to fulfill the demands of the resolution. In a resolution which poses the question "Are the individual rights of privacy more important than any other Constitutional right?," little, if any, discussion can take place outside of the status quo. Granting presumption to both sides in the debate, as would be consistent with the legislative paradigm view, offers nothing to the decision making process. Furthermore, since value propositions tend to discuss reality conditions rather than policy per se, the legislative paradigm becomes an even more inappropriate decision making tool. Brock, et al, provides excellent elaboration:

> With a legislative analogy in a process reality the concept of presumption would apply to policies, but it would not be relevant in discussing conditions or institutions. The quality of policies is judged by how well they respond to conditions. Thus, because conditions change continually, while administrative policy does not necessarily change correspondingly, policies seldom really match conditions. So under normal conditions, changes are good . . . Presumption has been undermined also by its failure to differentiate between changes in conditions and changes in policy. This differentiation is important, because in a process reality conditions are continually changing while policies must be acted upon. One would

> think that policies remain constant until a legislature modifies them in some way, but this is not quite the case. Administrative latitude allows regular, incremental change in policy, for example, in areas such as integration, school busing, and food stamps. At times, when the original policy statement is ambiguous, an administrator can circumvent the legislative process and even initiate major policy changes. This is especially true in foreign policy, where the President's power and jurisdiction are great.[3]

Mation, in his article, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption" further argues for the rejection of the legislative paradigm:

> Another unsuitable definition of presumption is that which places it with the status quo or existing institutions prior to the start of the debate. This approach places the burden of proof automatically on the value(s) or ethical system(s) which constitute unpopular opinion. To attempt to decide before a debate begins which side has the more popular or reasonable value system is to create a decision rule which ignores the positions of the advocates, dismisses the value system of the judge, and assumes that values operate in a fixed and universal hierarchy each time a proposition is being debated.[4]

Since it is reasonably clear that a legitimate paradigm is inapplicable, where then, as many have asked, does presumption lie in a value debate? The most reasonable standard, a position well-grounded in contemporary research, is one which places presumption against the resolution. Certainly the most easily understood and applied standard of presumption, a number of authors have chosen to support this position. The "he who asserts must prove" principle is closely aligned with this conclusion. Given the affirmative obligation to "assert" the resolution, it becomes their burden to defend it and the decision of the judge should be based on whether or not the affirmative was successful in fulfilling that burden. Courtney & Capp; Winds & Hastings; Dick; and Patterson & Zarefsky respectively arrive at the same decision: "By the mere statement of the question the affirmative has the burden of overcoming the natural advantage given to the negative of any properly phrased proposition."[5] "A proposition should be worded so that the negative has the benefit of presumption . . . The assumption is wisely and well founded that one need not be forced to defend the merits of current belief or action until they have been attacked."[6] "The presumption is with the negative side in a dispute."[7] "Presumption does not lie with any side or system; instead it is always against the resolution."[8]

In probable opposition to this standard are the positions espoused by Thomas & Fryar and Zeuschner & Hill. Thomas and Fryar, viewing presumption as a method of audience analysis indicated:

> If, however, we were to read Whately in his entirety, our theories of preusmption would be audience oriented. Among the implications of this reformulated interpretation of presumption, Sproule suggested that '. . . advocates should use presumption as a tool of audience analysis. The arguer is advised to ask such questions as: (1) to what groups do members of the audience belong? (2) to what sources of information (persons, books, groups) do audience members accord deference? (3) what is the popular and unpopular opinion on a particular subject? (4) what information on a subject might hold the advantage of novelty? Such queries would assist the advocate in selecting arguments and evidence best fitted to persuading persons on a given subject . . . Thus, an arguer would be wise to use, as evidence, sources of information perceived as credible by the audience.[9]

As quoted by Mation (1981), Zeuschner and Hill express a similar opinion:

> Since values and their society are at issue, the true roots of presumption should exist in the prevailing opinions and predominant values of society . . . Consider this point in the context of a value debate. The affirmative may claim psychological presumption, and the negative may counter claim the same presumption . . . The argument is addressed to the audience (the judge in a debate) and it is the audience or judge which affixes presumption.[10]

This position of presumption as a function of audience analysis contains the same inadequacies as the legislative paradigm. At the very least, it ignores the context of competitive value debate as a man-made convention. If, for example, prevailing opinion were aligned with the resolution, as was likely the case during the 1978-79 CEDA resolution (that Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy is Desirable) assigning presumption to the affirmative at the start of the debate would at best render the first affirmative speech virtually meaningless and at worst place an unreasonable burden on the negative team. The unfortunate negative team would have not only the burden of rebuttal, but also the burden of proving their own assertions, and the burden of overcoming the prevailing opinions of society and/or decision maker without the benefit of the first and last "stand on the floor." If, as Mation suggests, engaging in only direct refutation is far too easy a task, then this paradigm is clearly unreasonable, because of the significant advantage it accords the affirmative. Understandably, if, as policy debaters have argued under a multiplicity of topics, that increased stress is causally linked to higher incidences of death and disease, it is probable that, given this paradigm, a number of First Negatives would not survive the debate season.

Additionally, the prevailing opinion analysis is better applied to analysis of individual arguments and issues advanced during the course of the debate than to an evaluation of the resolution overall. Rieke and Sillars explain the distinction quite well:

> Note that there is a distinction between <u>the</u> burden of proof and a burden of proof. THE burden of proof always rests on the affirmative; it must prove that the proposition should be adopted. However, a burden of proof may rest on either the affirmative or the negative. Whoever introduces an issue or a contention into the debate has a burden of proof. The advocate must support the argument he introduces.[11]

Unquestionably, as long as human judges are utilized, some arguments will be evaluated more favorably than others, ultimately determined by the attitudes and opinions held by each decision maker. Presumption against the resolution does not serve to undermine those human qualities nor does it ask the decision maker to ignore them. It simply demands that the affirmative present a reasonable case supported by sufficient rationale and documentation rather than rely on the predispositions of society. It is blatantly unreasonable to demand that a negative argue a position sufficiently well-developed to defeat both the affirmative and decision maker simultaneously. Presumption against the resolution, however, does not in any way encourage unsubstantiated or poorly developed negative argumentation. In contrast, by requiring the affirmative to

provide a prima facie case strong enough to overcome a presumption against the resolution, it encourages affirmative teams to locate and utilize quality research and well-developed analysis. Well supported affirmative presentations, given the negative's burden of rebuttal, would undoubtedly demand equally well supported negative responses.

Presumption against the resolution, a concept embodied in hypothesis testing, seems, without question, the most advantageous and rational application of Whately's conceptualization. As Vasilius concludes:

> The paradigm (hypothesis testing) is also uniquely suited to propositions of value or judgement . . . The optimal approach to arguing propositions of value would use the most appropriate paradigm . . . Hypothesis testing seems to be the most appropriate paradigm for value proposition debating. First, hypothesis testing establishes presumption. As indicated above, presumption serves to establish duties and thus reduce some chaos by making debate possible. The traditional assignment of presumption, to the present system, is rarely possible in Value Proposition Debate. As Thomas Dye explained, 'There are no societal values usually agreed upon, but only the values of specific groups or individuals, many of which are conflicting.' Dye suggests that even generally held precepts lack such generalization when considered in a hierarchy. Presumption can hardly be assigned to a non-existent status quo. In some cases, the 1978-79 CEDA topic, for example, the proposition arguably is the status quo. Hypothesis testing provides reason to assign presumption.[12]

This standard of presumption also allows incorporation and consideration of a legal paradigm. As Sproule reveals, "Traditional treatments of Whately suggest that the Archbishop's theory may be interpreted as a predominantly legal insight. That is, objective rules govern the assignment of a monolithic single presumption to only one side in a dispute."[13] The legal paradigm is further elaborated by Eisenberg & Hardo and Ziegelmueller & Dause respectively: "Burden of proof is the counterpart of presumption. The latter refers to the 'logical advantage' held by an opponent of a proposition. In our courts of law, a man is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The presumption is in his favor; the burden of proof rests on the prosecution."[14]

> An example of presumption in a legal context is the presumption of innocence. In the American legal system an individual who is accused of a crime is presumed not guilty until proven otherwise. This presumption requires acquittal unless guilt is established by sufficient evidence. If the prosecuting attorney fails to present a case against the accused individual or presents an insufficient case, the presumption of innocence requires that the man be freed.[15]

In the trial setting, the audience is aware that it is the prosecution, the advocate who asserts the guilt of the defendant, which must carry the burden of proof. Rarely, if ever, must the defendant prove his innocence before guilt has been established. The clarity of these well-defined judicial roles can be applied to the value proposition realm with little difficulty. Mation discounts this application by claiming that the role of the accused and accuser are not clearly defined in a debate setting. If, however, presumption is assigned against the resolution prior to the start of the trial, the debater who acts as accuser and the debater who serves as the accused are readily identifiable.

Consistently placing the burden of proof on the affirmative team would finally provide the long needed clarity of argumentative roles CEDA has so long coveted, in addition to creating the advantages previously discussed. Neither CEDA nor presumption need be thought of as unmanageable "beasts." But debate coach and debater alike should be aware that the more we understand about the nature of this monolith we've created, the better chance we'll have to subdue it before it consumes us all in confusion.

NOTES

[1]Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision By Debate, New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1963, p. 83.

[2]Bernard L. Brock, James W. Cheesebro, John F. Cragan and James F. Klump, Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantage Debate, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973, p. 154.

[3]Ibid., pp. 153-4.

[4]Ronald J. Matlon, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption," Dimensions of Argument: Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, 1981, p. 499.

[5]Luther W. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1949, p.20.

[6]Russel R. Winds and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, New York: Random House, 1966, p.76.

[7]Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972, p.6.

[8]J.W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983, p.215.

[9]David A. Thomas and Maridell Fryar, "Value Resolutions, Presumption, and Stock Issues," Dimensions of Argument: Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, 1981, p. 519.

[10]Matlon, p.499.

[11]Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate: Rational Decision Making, Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing, Inc., 1966, p.33.

[12]Jan Vasilius, "Presumption, Presumption, Wherefore Art Thou Presumption," Presented at the Desert Argumentation Symposium in Tucson, Arizona, March, 1980, pp. 35-37.

[13]J. Michael Sproule, "The Psychological Burden of Proof: On the Evolutionary Development of Richard Whatley's Theory of Presumption," Communication Monographs, Vol. 43, June, 1976, p. 115.

[14]A.N. Eisenberg and Joseph A. Ilardo, Argument: An Alternative to Violence, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, p.25.

[15]George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975, p.19.